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The paper aims at reconstructing the industrial policy debate by focusing on a number 
of theoretical issues, in particular the contested nature of industrial policy – its 
selectivity – also in relation to manufacturing and the different rationales for 
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1. Introduction 
 
The dramatic transformations in the global manufacturing landscape started in the 
mid-1990s, but have been reinforced by the financial crisis and the subsequent 
recession. During the first phase of the crisis (2008-9), the manufacturing loss 
estimate reveals the collapse of industrial production worldwide with respect to both 
the zero growth scenario  and the sustained growth rate scenario (based on the 
average annual growth rate achieved in the pre-crisis period between 2000 and 2007). 
Specifically world manufacturing loss was between US $361.32 billion (with respect 
to the zero growth rate scenario) and US $875.72 billion (if we compare it with the 
sustained growth rate scenario) (Andreoni, 2015a).  
However, the manufacturing loss was uneven across countries. Among the top 
20 industrialised nations (see Table 1), Italy, followed by Spain and the UK  has 
experienced the most dramatic manufacturing loss. Against this background, the 
paper aims at reconstructing the industrial policy debate by focusing on a number of 
theoretical issues, in particular the contested nature of industrial policy – its 
selectivity – also in relation to manufacturing and the different rationales for 
industrial policy making. The paper concludes by looking ahead into the future of 
manufacturing and focuses on the need for rethinking our understanding of global 
production and emerging technologies for increased prosperity.  
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Table 1: The Effect of the financial crisis on the top twenty industrialised countries ranked by 
total MVA for the period 2007-2012 and according to different growth and industrial indicators. 
 
Ranking 
2012 by total  
MVA 
Country MVA  
var % 
MVApc 
var % 
GDP  
var % 
GDPpc  
var % 
MVAsh  
var 
WMVAsh  
var 
WGDPsh 
var 
1 United States of America -1.41% -5.63% 3.01% -1.40% -0.61% -1.56% -1.19% 
2 China 60.45% 56.64% 55.63% 51.94% 1.03% 5.90% 2.60% 
3 Japan -7.64% -7.58% -2.31% -2.25% -1.21% -1.62% -0.91% 
4 Germany -8.57% -7.99% 3.48% 4.14% -2.49% -1.04% -0.24% 
5 Republic of Korea 25.22% 22.42% 15.94% 13.34% 2.07% 0.52% 0.14% 
6 France -6.56% -9.08% 0.42% -2.29% -0.80% -0.37% -0.31% 
7 Italy -23.98% -25.81% -7.03% -9.27% -3.09% -1.05% -0.51% 
8 United Kingdom -14.75% -17.33% -3.40% -6.33% -1.33% -0.64% -0.51% 
9 India 38.46% 29.17% 38.01% 28.76% 0.05% 0.54% 0.57% 
10 Mexico 6.47% 0.12% 8.28% 1.82% -0.30% 0.01% 0.01% 
11 Brazil 3.83% -0.66% 17.51% 12.44% -1.75% -0.04% 0.18% 
12 Russian Federation -1.56% -1.15% 9.48% 9.94% -1.54% -0.12% 0.03% 
13 Canada -13.60% -17.83% 5.48% 0.32% -2.33% -0.34% -0.05% 
14 Spain -20.82% -24.49% -4.13% -8.57% -2.35% -0.50% -0.27% 
15 Turkey 19.60% 12.35% 16.67% 9.60% 0.44% 0.14% 0.09% 
16 China, Taiwan Province 6.96% 5.30% 11.14% 9.42% -0.99% 0.01% 0.02% 
17 Indonesia 26.73% 20.36% 32.97% 26.29% -1.26% 0.20% 0.15% 
18 Poland 37.37% 36.91% 18.54% 18.15% 3.00% 0.23% 0.07% 
19 Australia 4.44% -3.76% 12.20% 3.39% -0.68% -0.01% 0.07% 
20 Thailand 20.48% 16.87% 13.99% 10.57% 2.01% 0.11% 0.02% 
 
Note: MVA (Manufacturing Value Addition), GDP and GDPpc (Gross Domestic Product total and per 
capita), MVAsh var (Change in the share of MVA in total GDP), WMVAsh var (Change in the World 
MVA share), WGDPsh var (Change in the World GDP share).  
 
Source: Authors based on World Bank and UNIDO.   
 
 
 
2. The Contested Definition of Industrial Policy  
The controversial nature of industrial policy is testified to by the fact that there 
is actually no universally agreed definition of the term (Chang, 1994; Stiglitz and Lin, 
2013; Warwick, 2013, Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2014; Andreoni, 2016). The most 
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literal interpretation of industrial policy would be to define it to include any policy 
that affects industry (usually interpreted as the manufacturing industry), in the same 
way in which we would define fiscal policy as policy that affects government revenue 
and spending, and monetary policy as policy that affects monetary variables. Indeed, 
some commentators who adopt this definition would include even infrastructure 
policy, education policy and tax policy as parts of industrial policy (Chang, 1994; 
Andreoni, 2016b; Noman and Stigliz, 2016). 
The majority of the commentators on industrial policy, however, define 
industrial policy to mean „selective‟ industrial policy, „sectoral‟ industrial policy or 
„targeting‟ – namely, a policy that deliberately favours particular industries/sectors (or 
even firms) over others, against market signals, usually (but not necessarily) to 
enhance efficiency and promote productivity growth, for the whole economy as well 
as for the targeted industries themselves.  
Industrial policy thus defined has been even more controversial than more 
generally defined industrial policy. Many people believe that industrial policy should 
be of general (or functional or horizontal) kind, rather than of selective (or sectoral or 
vertical) kind. In this view, industrial policy should focus on „public goods‟ that 
benefit all industries equally but are likely to be under-provided by the market – e.g., 
education, research and development (R&D), and infrastructure – and not involve 
„picking winners‟. 
The fundamental problem with this view is that the distinction between 
selective and general industrial policies cannot take us very far. In a world with 
scarce resources, every policy choice you make, however general the policy involved 
may look, has discriminatory effects that amount to implicit targeting.  
For example, many people believe that education is one of those general 
industrial policies, but beyond the basic level (say, the first 9 years), education 
becomes specialised. So, for example, when we produce engineers, we do not produce 
some generic engineers but engineers specialised in certain areas. Therefore, a 
government providing more funding to electronics engineering departments than to 
chemical engineering departments is implicitly favouring the electronics industry. 
Likewise, there is no such thing as generic physical infrastructure. Physical 
infrastructure is always location-specific, so it affects different industries differently. 
Moreover, different modes of transportation have different impacts on different 
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industries – bulky goods (e.g., iron ore, wheat) will be helped more by developments 
of seaports and railways, while lighter goods, especially when they are perishable 
(e.g., flowers, fresh fish), will be helped more by developments of airports. Finally, if 
a government is giving out R&D subsidies, it is implicitly favouring the more R&D-
intensive higher-tech sectors.   
Thus seen, selectivity (targeting) is inevitable. Except the provision of basic 
education, calling which an „industrial policy‟ is really stretching the term beyond 
credulity, there is really no policy that does not involve some degree of targeting.  
Now, it may be said that, while targeting may be unavoidable, the less targeted 
a policy is, the better it is. However, this is not true. While less targeted policies may 
open themselves less to the possibilities of lobbying and „regulatory capture‟, they are 
more costly to implement. Being less precise and thus more difficult to monitor, they 
have more „leakages‟ than more targeted policies. Indeed, many mainstream 
economists have long argued that the welfare state should be more precisely targeted 
because there are simply too many leakages in the system of universal welfare. It is 
curious that this point is almost entirely ignored in relation to industrial policy. 
Given all this, we have to admit that we cannot „not target‟ and should try to 
attain the best possible degree of targeting, which may differ across industries and 
countries. We cannot assume that there is a linear relationship, positive or negative, 
between the degree of targeting and policy success. Some degree of targeting is 
inevitable, while some more of it may be desirable, but too much of it may not be 
good, although how much is too much is debatable (and one‟s position on it will 
depend on one‟s economic theories and political values).  
 
 
3. The Special Role of Manufacturing 
Industrial policy, according to our definition, does not involve only 
manufacturing industries. However, those who are interested in selective industrial 
policy tend to put great emphasis on the need to promote the manufacturing sector. 
The reasons are many and diverse. 
First, it is widely recognised that the manufacturing sector is the main source 
of technology-driven productivity growth in modern economies. It is not much of an 
exaggeration to say that manufacturing is what has made the modern world. Thanks to 
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the fact that the manufacturing activities lend themselves much more easily to 
mechanisation and chemical processing than do other types of economic activities, the 
manufacturing sector has been the main source of productivity growth throughout 
history. Productivity increase in agriculture is highly constrained by nature in terms of 
time, space, soil, and climate. By their very nature, many service activities are 
inherently impervious to productivity increases. In some cases, the very increase in 
productivity will destroy the product itself. If a string quartet trots through a 27-
minute piece in nine minutes, we won‟t say that its productivity has trebled. For some 
other services, the apparently higher productivity may be due to the de-basement of 
the product. A lot of the increases in retail service productivity in countries like the 
US and the UK have been bought by lowering the quality of the retail service itself – 
fewer shop assistants, longer drives to the supermarket, lengthier waits for deliveries, 
etc. The 2008 global financial crisis has also revealed that much of the recent 
productivity growth in finance had been achieved through the de-basement of the 
products – that is, the creation of overly complex, riskier, and even fraudulent 
products. 
Second, many argue that the manufacturing sector, especially the capital 
goods sector, has been the „learning centre‟ of capitalism in technological terms (for a 
review see Chang, 2010; Andreoni and Gregory, 2013; Chang et al., 2013). Because 
of its ability to produce productive inputs (e.g., machines, chemicals), what happens 
in the manufacturing sector has been extremely important in the productivity growth 
of other sectors. The increases in agricultural productivity would not have been 
remotely possible without the developments of manufacturing industries producing 
agricultural machinery, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and increasingly genetic 
engineering. The rapid increases in the productivity of services like logistics and retail 
in the last couple of decades were also made possible by manufacturing industries 
producing more efficient transport equipment, computers, and mechanised 
warehouses.  
Third, the manufacturing sector has also been the source of organisational 
innovation. Productivity growth in the last two centuries has been driven not just by 
technological changes but also organizational changes, most of which originated in 
the manufacturing sector. For example, these days many fast food restaurants use 
„factory‟ techniques, turning cooking into an assembly job and sometimes even 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Economia e Politica Industriale published online 
16 September 2016 by Springer. The final publication is available via: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40812-016-
0057-2  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23187/  
 
7 
 
7 
delivering food on conveyor belts. For another example, large retail chains – be they 
supermarkets, clothes shop chains, or on-line retailers – apply modern inventory 
management techniques, developed in the manufacturing sector. Even in the 
agricultural sector, productivity has been raised in some countries through the 
application of manufacturing-style organisational knowledge, like computer-
controlled feeding.  
Fourth, the manufacturing sector has been the main source of demand for 
high-productivity activities in other industries. For example, most of the service 
activities that have high productivity and have seen high productivity growths 
recently (e.g., finance, transport, and business services) are „producer‟ services, 
whose main customers are manufacturing firms. Of course, countries can specialise in 
those services, but their ability to export them cannot be maintained in the long run 
without a strong manufacturing sector. In those services, insights gained from the 
production process and the continuous interaction between the provider and the 
clients are crucial. Given this, a weakening manufacturing base will eventually lead to 
a decline in the quality, and exportability, of those services (Tassey, 2010; Pisano & 
Shih, 2012; Berger, 2013). 
Fifth, the manufacturing sector, producing physical and non-perishable 
products, has higher tradability than agriculture and, especially, services. At the root 
of the low tradability of services lies the fact that many services require their 
providers and consumers to be in the same location. No one has yet invented ways to 
provide haircut or house cleaning long-distance. Of course, this problem will be 
solved if the service provider (the hairdresser or the cleaner in the above examples) 
can move to the customer‟s country, but that in most cases means immigration, which 
most countries severely restrict. Given this, a rising share of services in the economy 
means that the country, other things being equal, will have lower export earnings. 
This, in turn, means that, unless the exports of manufactured goods rise 
disproportionately, the country won‟t be able to pay for the same amount of imports 
as before.  
 
4. Theories of Industrial Policy 
Unless we live in the fantasy world of perfect markets, industrial policy does 
not lack theoretical justifications (for reviews, see Chang and Andreoni, 2016). This is 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Economia e Politica Industriale published online 
16 September 2016 by Springer. The final publication is available via: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40812-016-
0057-2  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23187/  
 
8 
 
8 
not a place to review these theories in any detail, so let us just provide an overview of 
the key types of arguments. 
 
4.1. Interdependences 
There are various arguments that justify industrial policy, especially of 
selective type, on the basis of the existence of interdependence between different 
activities. The best-known of this type of argument are those based on demand 
complementarities and increasing returns (to scale) in manufacturing industries, 
which were prominent in Classical Economics and in early Development Economics 
(Andreoni & Scazzieri, 2014). The first variety of these is the so-called Big Push 
argument – or the balanced growth model – of Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and Ragnar 
Nurkse, which argues that there needs to be a coordination of investment between 
interdependent activities, as their returns depend on there being all the complementary 
investments. Using a similar insight, the so-called linkages argument of Albert 
Hirschman advocates industrial policy that first promotes industries with particularly 
strong interdependences with other sectors, whether as suppliers of inputs into other 
industries (forward linkages) or as purchasers of outputs of other industries (backward 
linkages), thus setting off chain reactions in different directions.  
Second, there are less well-known justifications for industrial policy based on 
interdependences between competing – rather than complementary – activities. In 
oligopolistic industries with lumpy investments, simultaneous investments by 
competing firms may result in excess capacity, which may push some firms into 
bankruptcy, which in turn means that the resources invested in them will have been 
wasted – unless the machines and skills involved are of very general nature and can 
be redeployed elsewhere easily, which rarely is the case in modern industries. In order 
to prevent such „wasteful competition‟, countries, especially Japan and Korea, have 
used entry restrictions and government-approved investment cartels so that 
investments are staggered at suitable intervals (Chang, 1994). 
Coordination problems among competing investments may be related not only 
to investment but also to situations of temporary disinvestment or structural change in 
the industrial sector. Recession cartels and mechanisms of negotiated exit have been 
widely used to face periods of economic crisis or accompany structural transformation 
(Dore, 1986). In these situations, industrial policies introduce “a „protective‟ element 
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– that is „helping losers‟ by temporarily shielding them from the full forces of the 
market” (Chang, 2003, p. 262). More generally, support for declining sectors may be 
seen as an attempt to socialise risk, in order to encourage and sustain the process of 
structural change and productivity growth, from which economic development 
derives. 
Third, there is the externality argument, in which industrial policy is deployed 
to compensate for under-investment in (and thus under-production of) certain 
activities due to the fact that their providers do not reap the full benefits from their 
efforts. Supports for basic R&D or worker training are classic cases. More recently,  
some commentators have developed an argument for industrial policy based on 
„information externality‟. The argument is that investments are not made in industries 
because the potential „pioneer‟ firm is afraid of providing „free experiment‟ to 
competitors, who may then imitate it and deprive it of what Schumpeter would have 
called „entrepreneurial profit‟ (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003; for a critique see Chang 
and Andreoni, 2016). 
 
4.2. Capabilities 
Another important set of arguments for industrial policy is based on the time-
consuming and costly nature of the process of accumulating productive capabilities 
(Chang, 1994; Andreoni, 2014). Productive capabilities are personal and collective 
skills, productive knowledge and experience that are embedded in physical agents and 
organisations. 
The most famous argument along this line is the infant industry argument. 
This is based on the understanding that productive capabilities can be accumulated 
only over time and in an unpredictable way. Given this, new producers need a period 
of protection – through tariffs, subsidies (related to equipment investments, R&D, and 
worker training), regulation on foreign direct investment (FDI), and other measures – 
from competitive forces coming from abroad, in the same way in which children need 
protection before they can go out and compete in the labour market unassisted. This 
argument applies to the catching-up economies particularly strongly, but can hold for 
all countries, insofar as their producers in certain sectors are trying to catch up with 
superior producers abroad. The ultimate example of the latter case is the development 
of Airbus by the European governments against what looked like an insurmountable 
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US dominance in the civilian aircraft market.  
Another capabilities-related justification for industrial policy is based on 
policies providing support for small producers – such as small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in the manufacturing sector and small farms. The problem is that 
capability accumulation needs some indivisible inputs that small producers cannot 
provide on their own – R&D, machinery, or worker training. There are many 
industrial policy measures intended to solve this problem. The government can 
directly provide these inputs through public R&D, training of workers in public 
universities and training institutes, and the provision of „extension service‟ for  SMEs 
and small farmers. It may subsidise those inputs through the provision of R&D 
subsidies, credit guarantees (which will promote physical investments, among other 
things), or training subsidies. On top of all these, the government may provide legal 
and other backings for voluntary cooperative arrangements among small producers – 
such as tax advantages for cooperatives among small producers or subsidies for 
particular joint activities among firms (e.g., R&D, processing, export marketing).  
The third capability-based justification for industrial policy rationale is known 
as the „industrial commons‟ argument. The argument is rooted in the fact that 
productive capabilities have a fundamental collective nature, that is, their 
development and application is very much the result of interdependent processes of 
learning and production, each of which involves a variety of actors (Richardson, 
1972; Andreoni et al., 2016). Given this, the effective coordination of actors endowed 
with different capabilities becomes a key determinant of competitiveness. A 
representative study in this line of argument is Pisano and Shih (2012). Using 
information from the semiconductor, electronics, pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries, the study shows how the production and innovation capacities of a given 
economic system depend on the presence of multiple resources, such as R&D know-
how, engineering skills, technological capabilities, and specific manufacturing and 
prototyping competences.  
The industrial commons literature stresses that even the development of high-
tech cutting-edge products often depends (amongst other factors) on the commons of 
a mature manufacturing industry. The maintenance of industrial commons 
necessitates not only the maintenance of a manufacturing base of a certain size and 
diversity but also various forms of what we call in this paper „intermediate 
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institutions‟ – industry associations, trade unions, research institutes, and educational 
institutions. (Andreoni et al., 2016; Chang and Andreoni, 2016). 
 
4.3. Risk and Uncertainty 
There are a lot of justifications for industrial policy that are based on the 
recognition that there are inherent discrepancies in the ability to deal with risk and 
uncertainty between individual producers (whether they are corporations or individual 
workers) and the society as a whole – often expressed somewhat misleadingly as 
„capital market failure‟ (implying, implausibly, that a „perfect‟ capital market will 
finance any project that is viable) (Chang and Andreoni, 2016).  
One classic argument of this kind is based on the observation that the 
government often has the „deepest pocket‟ in the country and thus the strongest ability 
to deal with risk. This is why many ambitious, high-risk projects have had to be 
subsidised by the government – as in the case of Airbus – especially when the 
country‟s capital market is of „impatient‟ variety, like the UK one. When it comes to 
backward economies entering technologically most demanding industries, the risk is 
incalculable and thus turns into uncertainty. In such cases, establishing state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) may be the only solution. Korea‟s steel-maker (POSCO), 
established in the late 1960s when the country‟s income was only 4% of the US 
income, and Brazil‟s aircraft manufacturer (EMBRAER), established in the late 1950s 
when the country‟s income was only 8% of the US income, are the supreme examples 
of this kind.  
Second, governments have often deployed industrial policy to restructure 
companies in trouble on the recognition that a major corporate restructuring – or even 
restructuring of an entire industry (like the shipbuilding industry in Japan in the 1980s 
or the automobile industry in the US after 2008) – involves risk of scales that private 
sector investors are simply not interested in taking. Policies include government 
taking of an equity stake (which often results in majority control), state-mediated 
mergers, coordinated capacity scrapping, provision of loan guarantees, public 
subsidisation of severance payments, and transitional subsidies. 
Third, some governments, especially those in Scandinavia, have taken 
cognisance of the fact that, in a fast-changing world, workers are exposed to levels of 
risk that they cannot simply bear on an individual basis. On this recognition, these 
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governments have provided a comprehensive welfare state – especially strong 
unemployment insurance, job search services, subsidised retraining, and even 
subsidies for re-location (e.g., government providing bridging loans to workers who 
have to sell their house to move to their new jobs) (Chang, 1994). These are not 
„industrial policies‟ in the sense we have defined in this paper, but they help industrial 
developments by promoting smoother structural change. 
 
5. Looking Ahead into the Future of Manufacturing and Policy 
 The continued loss of manufacturing capabilities in advanced industrial 
countries, in particular the UK, Italy and Spain (if we focus on the European context) 
necessarily disadvantages these economies over the long-term because the 
manufacturing sector boosts technologically-driven productivity growth and has 
strong interdependences with other high-value sectors, especially high-value-added 
services, in the economy (Chang and Andreoni, 2014; Mazzucato et al., 2015; 
Andreoni, 2015b; Pianta and Zanfei, 2016) . Although exactly what would be high-
value industries in 20, not to speak of 50, years‟ time is difficult to predict, what is 
certain is that the potential of these advanced economies to tap into the most 
profitable supply chains of the future and capture value will largely depend on the 
industrial capabilities that they build and retain today. 
This means that industrial policy have to take full account of the fast-
technological changes and the „genetic mutation‟ of manufacturing industries 
(Andreoni, 2015b). As eloquently documented in Tassey (2010:6): “Most modern 
technologies are systems, which means interdependencies exist among a set of 
industries that contribute advanced materials, various components, subsystems, 
manufacturing systems and eventually service systems based on sets of manufactured 
hardware and software. The modern global economy is therefore constructed around 
supply chains, whose tiers (industries) interact in complex ways”. The effectiveness 
of industrial policy increasingly depends on the capacity of policy makers to deal with 
these emerging complexities in local and global manufacturing systems, as well as 
their sub-systems and interdependencies. These „glo-cal‟ manufacturing systems are 
composed of sectoral value chains organised both vertically (towards the final 
markets) and horizontally (across different chains of sub-contracting and supply, 
including providers of knowledge-intensive services). They also involve 
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heterogeneous organisations performing distinctive productive and technological 
functions. According to their positions in the value chains, these organisations 
contribute differently to value addition and can capture different shares of the value 
generated by their chains (Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Chang and Andreoni, 2016).  
The complex architecture of modern (and future) manufacturing systems 
largely stems from the fact that they increasingly rely on cross-cutting technology 
systems, including different „types‟ of technology. There are „proprietary 
technologies‟ generally associated to specific products and whose functioning rely on 
a certain „platform technologies‟ emerging from the science base. But there are also 
„production technologies‟ used for transforming materials in new products and whose 
deployment often require the access to „infra-technologies‟ like measurement and test 
equipment (Tassey, 2010; Andreoni, 2015b and 2016b). These different technologies 
enable multiple production activities (also processes and tasks as their components)  
in different manufacturing industries. In the European context, this recognition has 
repositioned the industrial policy debate around the pervasive role played by key 
enabling technologies (KETs),  that is,  advanced materials, biotechnologies, 
photonics, micro and nanotechnologies, microelectronics and advanced 
manufacturing technologies. Given these recent „genetic mutations‟ in manufacturing 
and technology systems, the selectivity of industrial policy is no more reducible to the 
sectoral distinction in the traditional sense. Industrial policy selectivity will be 
increasingly centred around the strategic targeting of specific activities and productive 
organisations within these sectoral value chains and around the underpinning mix of 
enabling technologies. This means that the traditional sectoral axis of interventions 
will have to be (and already is in a few countries) gradually replaced by a policy 
matrix combining sectoral value chains and different enabling technologies. Industrial 
and technology policies will increasingly have to operate within the matrix of sectoral 
value chain – technology system (Andreoni, 2015b and 2016b). 
In those industrialised economies affected by fast de-industrialisation, 
selective industrial policies must also help the transformation of mature industrial 
systems and shape, jointly with the private sector initiatives, new diversification 
trajectories towards higher-value product segments (Best, 1990; Berger, 2013; Pisano 
and Shih, 2012; Andreoni et al, 2016). This requires selective reductions in the risks 
involved in critical technology investments, rebuilding of domestic manufacturing 
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capabilities, and re-scaling of existing production capacity to suit the needs of the new 
technologies . These different, although complementary, goals can be achieved only 
with integrated packages of policy instruments. Their alignment and synchronisation 
is critical in shaping the development of the industrial ecosystems of the future.  
Despite what the opponents of industrial policy may have us believe, 
industrial policy has always been around, even though some countries have called it 
with just another name, like the US has done throughout its history, and even though 
others have had it without realising that it had one, thus failing to properly organise it 
in a selective manner. Given this, it is better to accept that targeted industrial policy is 
necessary and try to get the targeting right, rather than pretending that there is no 
targeting and making a mess of the policy. 
And industrial policy is here to stay. Countries like China are going to step up 
their industrial policies, as they try to break into the premier league of world industry. 
Whatever the big rhetoric at the central government is, a lot of industrial policy is 
going to chug along in countries like Germany, as their industrial policies are deeply 
rooted in local structures. The US will keep at its industrial policy through federal 
R&D funding, and perhaps keep denying that it has any industrial policy. Singapore 
may continue its emphasis on free trade, but it will keep targeting strategic industries 
and setting explicit goals, in order to maintain its manufacturing base. Countries like 
Japan and Korea, having toned down their industrial policies since the 1990s for 
various good and bad reasons, are now trying to revive at least some of their industrial 
policy measures, especially in high-technology industries. Finland has successfully 
restructured its industrial policy by putting great emphasis on funding innovation and 
will press on with that strategy (for a review see Chang et al., 2013).  
By constantly being in denial about the need for better industrial policy, 
today‟s de-industrialising advanced countries are going to fall further and further 
behind in manufacturing industries.  
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